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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
 Amici Curiae are academic specialists on univer-
sal jurisdiction and denial of justice under the law of 
nations. They have an important interest in this case, 
which raises the question of whether and under what 
circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1350, allows courts to recognize causes of action for 
violations of the law of nations in foreign territory. 
Universal jurisdiction and denial of justice are 
longstanding law-of-nations principles that bear 
heavily on the resolution of this question. Amici 
respectfully submit this Brief in support of neither 
party to clarify the law and history relating to these 
principles in the law of nations and U.S. law. Amici 
are:  
 Anthony A. D’Amato, Leighton Professor of Law, 
Northwestern University, author of numerous books, 
including THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (1971), THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT: AN ANALYTI-
CAL ANTHOLOGY (with Ralph G. Steinhardt) (1999), 
and over 100 articles, including The Alien Tort Stat-
ute and the Founding of the Constitution, 82 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 62 (1988). He is a member of the Supreme 
Court Bar. 
 
 1 This Brief has been filed with the written consent of the 
parties, which is on file with the Clerk of Court. Pursuant to 
Rule 37.6, Amici Curiae state that no counsel for a party au-
thored this Brief in whole or in part, nor did any person or 
entity, other than Amici Curiae, make a monetary contribution 
to the preparation or submission of this Brief. 
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 Anthony J. Colangelo, Assistant Professor of Law, 
Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of 
Law, author of numerous articles on universal juris-
diction and U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction, includ-
ing A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 97 VA. 
L. REV. 1019 (2011); Universal Jurisdiction as an 
International “False Conflict” of Laws, 30 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 881 (2009); Constitutional Limits on Extrater-
ritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of 
National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L. J. 
121 (2007), cited in United States v. Hamdan, Ruling 
on Motion to Dismiss (Ex Post Facto) 5-6 (July 14, 
2008); United States v. Emmanuel (a.k.a. Chuckie 
Taylor), No. 06-20758-CR, 2007 WL 2002452 (S.D. 
Fla. July 5, 2007); Goldberg v. UBS, Ltd., 690 
F. Supp. 2d 92 (E.D.N.Y. 2010); United States v. 
Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2010); and The 
Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 149 (2006), cited in In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 
617 F. Supp. 2d 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); United States v. 
Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2010). 
--------------------------------- ? --------------------------------- 
 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 The question presented is “whether and under 
what circumstances the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1350, allows courts to recognize a cause of action 
for violations of the law of nations occurring within 
the territory of a sovereign other than the United 
3 
States.”2 In this Amicus Brief we argue from a histor-
ical perspective going back to the Middle Ages that 
when the law of nations is in issue, not only is there 
no presumption against extraterritoriality, but juris-
diction over causes of action arising abroad is in 
many cases required. More specifically, we argue that 
Congress affirmatively conferred universal jurisdic-
tion in the Alien Tort Statute [“ATS”] under the law of 
nations, and that to refuse such jurisdiction in cases 
of denial of justice would be contrary to longstanding 
principles of the law of nations. In short, limiting the 
ATS to claims arising in U.S. territory would contra-
vene both the statute’s clear indication of universal 
jurisdiction and the Charming Betsy canon of con-
struction that statutes should not be construed to 
violate the law of nations.3  
--------------------------------- ? --------------------------------- 
 
ARGUMENT 
I. The ATS Affirmatively Confers Universal 
Jurisdiction 
 No presumption against extraterritoriality 
applies to the ATS. The statute clearly indicates 
universal jurisdiction by expressly incorporating the 
law of nations, which contains both substantive and 
 
 2 Order in Pending Case, Kiobel, Esther, et al. v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum, et al., No. 10-1491 (U.S. Mar. 5, 2012). 
 3 Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy (The Charming 
Betsy), 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). 
4 
jurisdictional components.4 A much-cited case from 
1818 generally regarded as the Supreme Court’s first 
invention of a presumption against extraterritoriality, 
United States v. Palmer, applied a limiting presump-
tion to block U.S. jurisdiction over the universal 
offense of piracy on a foreign-flag vessel because the 
vessel was considered the legal equivalent of foreign 
sovereign territory. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 632-33 
(1818). Congress immediately rejected that construc-
tion and enacted a new statute the very next year 
granting universal jurisdiction. Crucially, Congress 
rewrote the statute to affirmatively confer universal 
jurisdiction by expressly granting jurisdiction over 
“piracy, as defined by the law of nations.” Act of Mar. 
3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513-14. By invoking 
“the law of nations,” Congress purposefully autho-
rized the application of both an international substan-
tive rule and an international jurisdictional principle 
so as to confer upon U.S. courts universal jurisdiction 
to apply that rule. The ATS similarly expressly con-
fers jurisdiction over torts “in violation of the law of 
nations,” 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and similarly should be 
understood to authorize application of international 
substantive and jurisdictional components of that 
law.  
 
 4 Every rule of international law down through the 19th 
Century was a combination of substantive and jurisdictional 
components for the simple reason that there were hardly any 
international courts; only national courts were consistently 
available to apply international law. 
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 In brief, Congress knew how to bestow universal 
jurisdiction over law-of-nations violations in what 
was clearly considered foreign territory, and did so by 
explicitly incorporating into statutes “the law of 
nations,” which includes both substantive and juris-
dictional components. It would be inappropriate for 
this Court to read that “affirmative indication” of 
jurisdiction out of the ATS today. Morrison v. Nat’l 
Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010). Indeed, it 
would be especially inappropriate since Congress 
could not have known of any judicially created pre-
sumption at the time it enacted the ATS and used 
precisely the “law of nations” language to repudiate a 
presumption against extraterritoriality as applied to 
the early piracy statute. 
 
A. Universal Jurisdiction Authorizes All 
States to Apply the Law of Nations 
 To understand how the ATS confers universal 
jurisdiction under the law of nations it is first neces-
sary to understand universal jurisdiction. The inter-
national legal principle existed at the time Congress 
enacted the ATS, it exists under the “present-day law 
of nations,” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 
725 (2004), and it was recognized by this Court’s 
decision in Sosa, see id. at 732. Universal jurisdiction 
grants every state in the world jurisdiction to apply 
international law to certain violations of the law of 
nations, even if the state had no connection to the 
violation when and where it occurred. This is indeed 
one of the principle’s defining characteristics: When 
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states exercise universal jurisdiction, they do not 
apply solely national law to activity beyond their 
borders but an international law that already applied 
to the activity when and where it occurred.  
 This Court made the point clearly in United 
States v. Smith with regard to the original universal 
jurisdiction offense of piracy: 
[t]he common law . . . recognises and punishes 
piracy as an offence, not against its own mu-
nicipal code, but as an offence against the 
law of nations, (which is part of the common 
law,) as an offence against the universal law 
of society, a pirate being deemed an enemy of 
the human race.  
18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161-62 (1820). The substan-
tive prohibition on universal violations of the law of 
nations is tied intimately with a jurisdictional princi-
ple that all states may enforce that prohibition:  
And the general practice of all nations in 
punishing all persons, whether natives or 
foreigners, who have committed this offence 
against any persons whatsoever, with whom 
they are in amity, is a conclusive proof that 
the offence is supposed to depend, not upon 
the particular provisions of any municipal 
code, but upon the law of nations, both for its 
definition and punishment. 
Id. at 162. See also United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. 
(5 Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820) (explaining that piracy 
is subject to “universal jurisdiction” and that it 
“is considered as an offence within the criminal 
 
7 
jurisdiction of all nations[ ]  It is against all, and 
punished by all”). Similarly, Blackstone declared 
piracy “an offence against the universal law of socie-
ty; a pirate being . . . hostis humani generis.” 5 W. 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
71 (1769); see also id. (“[B]y declaring war against all 
mankind, all mankind must declare war against 
him.”). As these authorities make clear, universal 
jurisdiction grants all states jurisdiction to enforce 
international law. When a state exercises universal 
jurisdiction, it does not extend national law extrater-
ritorially to foreign conduct but rather acts as a 
decentralized enforcer of the law of nations that 
already applied to the conduct when and where it 
occurred.  
 Universal jurisdiction works the same way today5 
and gives rise to ATS liability under Sosa’s methodology. 
 
 5 Today treaties, while not themselves the customary law of 
nations (since they are positive agreements among states), 
provide strong evidence of what customary international law 
deems universal jurisdiction violations by demonstrating “the 
customs and usages of civilized nations,” The Paquete Habana, 
175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900), resulting from widespread state 
practice ratifying and implementing the treaties in domestic 
law. For example, treaties like the Convention Against Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465 
U.N.T.S. 85, arts. 5.2, 7.1, and the Montreal Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Avia-
tion, Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177, arts. 5, 7, 
authorize and, in many situations, require the exercise of 
jurisdiction by states parties with personal jurisdiction over 
offenders – even if the state had no connection to the offense 
when it occurred. Any doubt about the customary lawmaking 
(Continued on following page) 
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For example, Sosa cited United States v. Smith – the 
criminal piracy case quoted at length above – to 
demonstrate the “historical paradigms” that inform 
ATS inquiries under “the present-day law of na-
tions.” 542 U.S. at 732. As discussed, Smith’s defini-
tion of piracy under the law of nations included 




character of the treaties is resolved by the fact that they do not 
condition the exercise of universal jurisdiction by states parties 
with custody of the accused on the commission of the offense 
within the territory of another state party to the treaty. By 
effectively extending the prohibition in the treaty to any state in 
the world where the offense occurs, these treaties are quintes-
sential “law-making” treaties, or treaties of customary “norm-
creating character.” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 
F.3d 111, 138-39 (2d Cir. 2010); see also North Sea Continental 
Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41 (Feb. 20); 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 102(3) (1987). In other words, the treaties clearly 
reflect “the customs and usages of civilized nations,” The 
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700, with respect to both what 
conduct is substantively prohibited under the law of nations and 
when states have jurisdiction over that conduct. In this regard, 
the treaties help cure the Court’s early lament in Smith that 
“[o]ffences . . . against the law of nations, cannot, with any 
accuracy, be said to be completely ascertained and defined in any 
public code recognised by the common consent of nations.” 18 
U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 159 (relying on writings of twenty five 
publicists or scholars to ascertain the settled definition and 
scope of piracy under the law of nations). Today such a code 
largely exists in the form of widely ratified multilateral treaties. 
And they unambiguously provide jurisdiction where a state 
gains personal jurisdiction over the perpetrator of certain 
universal violations of the present-day law of nations – even if 
that state had no connection to the violation when it occurred. 
9 
substantively, piracy comprised robbery on the high 
seas; jurisdictionally, “all nations . . . punish[ ]  all 
persons, whether natives or foreigners, who have 
committed this offence against any persons whatso-
ever.” 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 161-62. Immediately after 
citing Smith, Sosa cited the Second Circuit’s famous 
statement in Filártiga v. Peña-Irala that, “for purpos-
es of civil liability, the torturer has become – like the 
pirate and slave trader before him – hostis humani 
generis – an enemy of all mankind.” 542 U.S. at 732. 
Factually, Filártiga involved a foreign plaintiff, 
foreign defendant, and foreign conduct. Legally, as 
with Smith’s recitation of universal jurisdiction over 
an “enemy of the human race,” Filártiga’s invocation 
of an “enemy of all mankind” encompasses both a 
substantive prohibition and a jurisdictional principle 
that all states can enforce that international legal 
prohibition. 542 U.S. at 732. As the next section 
explains, Sosa got it exactly right: The ATS affirma-
tively confers universal jurisdiction to apply the law 
of nations and no presumption against extraterritori-
ality limits the application of that law.  
 
B. The ATS Embodies Universal Jurisdic-
tion 
 This Court recently reaffirmed that a presump-
tion against extraterritoriality applies to U.S. stat-
utes. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (“When a statute 
gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial appli-
cation, it has none.”). The presumption is not a limi-
tation on sovereignty but a canon of construction 
designed to effectuate legislative intent. Id. As this 
10 
Court explained early on in United States v. Palmer, 
even where Congress has power to legislate, general 
statutory “words must be limited in some degree, and 
the intent of the legislature will determine the extent 
of this limitation. For this intent we must examine 
the law.” 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 631-32 (1818). When 
“examin[ing] the law,” id., “[a]ssuredly context can be 
consulted as well.” Morrision, 130 S. Ct. at 2883. The 
language and context of the ATS clearly demonstrate 
that to the extent courts use the law of nations as the 
rule of decision under the statute, the statute confers 
universal jurisdiction under that law.  
 Palmer used a species of presumption against 
extraterritoriality to restrictively construe the reach 
of a 1790 statute prohibiting piracy, defined as 
“robbery . . . upon the high seas” by “any person or 
persons.” 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 626 (1818). The 
Court held that the statute did not reach such acts 
committed by foreigners against foreigners on a 
foreign-flag ship. Id. at 631. Here it should be 
stressed – especially given this Court’s framing of 
the issue in the present case for re-argument – that 
piracy on another nation’s ship constituted a “viola-
tion[ ]  of the law of nations occurring within the 
territory of a sovereign other than the United States,” 
Order in Pending Case, Kiobel, Esther, et al. v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum, et al., No. 10-1491 (U.S. Mar. 5, 
2012), since traditionally “[a] vessel at sea is consid-
ered as a part of the territory to which it belongs 
when at home. It carries with it the local legal rights 
11 
and legal jurisdiction of such locality.” Wilson v. 
McNamee, 102 U.S. 572, 574 (1880).6  
 To be sure, it was precisely this jurisdictional 
feature and the attendant fear of foreign sovereign 
interference that caused the Court in Palmer to 
restrict the 1790 piracy statute’s scope. The Court 
first observed that the title of the entire act – “ ‘an act 
for the punishment of certain crimes against the 
United States’ ” – suggested that Congress’s concern 
was with “offences against the United States, not 
offences against the human race.” Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 
Wheat.) at 631. The Court then turned to its principal 
concern that reading all of the piracy statute’s gen-
eral terms globally would interfere with other na-
tions’ sovereignty by projecting U.S. law onto the 
legal equivalent of foreign sovereign territory – 
namely, foreign-flag ships.  
 For the 1790 act prohibited not just “robbery . . . 
upon the high seas” – which constituted piracy under 
the law of nations, Smith, 18 U.S. (Wheat.) at 161-62 
– but also purely municipal offenses like “run[ing] 
away” with a ship or merchandise or “lay[ing] violent 
hands upon [a] commander.” Palmer, 16 U.S. 
(Wheat.) at 626-27. These latter offenses did not 
constitute piracy under the law of nations but were  
 
 
 6 See also St. Clair v. United States, 154 U.S. 134, 152 
(1894); United States v. Smiley, 27 F. Cas. 1132, 1134 (C.C.N.D. 
Cal. 1864) (No. 16,317).  
12 
instead referred to as “piracy . . . by statute.” 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at 72; see also Anthony J. 
Colangelo, A Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality, 
97 VA. L. REV. 1019, 1061-75 (2011) (addressing the 
difference between piracy under the law of nations 
and piracy by statute). These piracies by statute were 
solely creatures of municipal or domestic law, not 
international law. As a result, they were subject only 
to territorial (or flag) and national jurisdiction, not 
universal jurisdiction. Id.  
 The Palmer Court worried that Congress could 
not have intended all of these other general terms 
prohibiting piracy by statute under municipal law to 
apply globally to activities on foreign-flag ships. The 
reason was that such extraterritorial application of 
U.S. law into a foreign jurisdiction could interfere 
with foreign sovereignty:  
But it cannot be supposed that the legisla-
ture intended to punish a seaman on board a 
ship sailing under a foreign flag, under the 
jurisdiction of a foreign government, who 
should lay violent hands up, on his com-
mander, or make a revolt in the ship. These 
are offences against the nation under whose 
flag the vessel sails, and within whose par-
ticular jurisdiction all on board the vessel 
are. Every nation provides for such offences 
the punishment its own policy may dictate; 
and no general words of a statute ought to be 
construed to embrace them when committed 
by foreigners against a foreign government. 
13 
Palmer, 16 U.S. (Wheat.) at 632-33.7 The Court then 
reasoned backward from this supposition about the 
piracies by statute listed in the latter part of the 1790 
act to the particular piracy in the case before it – 
robbery on the seas by “any person” – and gave that 
piracy the same, limited construction. Id. at 633 
(“That the general words of the two latter members of 
this sentence [piracies by statute] are to be restricted 
to offences committed on board the vessels of the 
United States, furnishes strong reason for believing 
that the legislature intended to impose the same 
restriction on the general words used in the first 
member of the sentence [robbery on the high seas or 
piracy under the law of nations].”).  
 Yet according to Congress – which presumably 
knew its own intent – the Court got it wrong. Palmer 
was “roundly criticized by contemporaries” for limit-
ing the scope of the 1790 statute and stunting the 
 
 7 That Palmer had to do with the fact that the offense 
occurred on foreign territory is confirmed by the Court’s decision 
just two years later in United States v. Klintock, which dealt 
with the same section of the same 1790 statute as Palmer, but 
the piracy had occurred on a stateless, instead of a foreign-flag, 
ship. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144 (1820). The Court distinguished 
Klintock on this basis and applied the statute on the ground that 
Palmer only governed ships “sailing under the flag of a foreign 
State, whose authority is acknowledged. This is the case which 
was presented to the Court [in Palmer]; and this is the case 
which was decided.” Id. at 151; see also id. at 152 (observing that 
general statutory terms “ought not to be so construed as to 
extend to persons under the acknowledged authority of a foreign 
State”). These cases make crystal clear that ships were deemed 
part of the territory of the state under whose flag they sailed.  
14 
United States’s ability to prosecute piracy under the 
law of nations.8 In one famous criticism, John Quincy 
Adams renounced Palmer as “a sample of judicial 
logic – disingenuous, false, and hollow” and an 
“enormous hole in the moral garment of this nation 
made by this desperate thrust of the Supreme Court.” 
J. Q. Adams, diary entry for May 11, 1819, in 4 THE 
MEMOIRS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 363 (C. Adams ed., 
1874-77).  
 In direct response to Palmer, Congress passed a 
new piracy statute the very next year to mend the 
hole Palmer had hewn and affirmatively create 
universal jurisdiction over piracy against the law of 
nations.9 The statute, accordingly, conferred jurisdic-
tion over “any person or persons whatsoever” who 
“shall, on the high seas, commit the crime of piracy, 
as defined by the law of nations.” Act of Mar. 3, 1819, 
ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513-14 (emphasis added).  
 In short, to overrule Palmer and affirmatively 
indicate universal jurisdiction, Congress expressly 
 
 8 G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and International 
Law: The Piracy Cases, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 727, 731 (1989). 
 9 See United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599, 612 (E.D. 
Va. 2010) (“In response to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the Act of 1790 in Palmer, Congress passed the Act of 1819 to 
make clear that it wished to proscribe not only piratical acts 
that had a nexus to the United States, but also piracy as an 
international offense subject to universal jurisdiction.”); ALFRED 
P. RUBIN, THE LAW OF PIRACY 158 (2d ed. 1998) (“The immediate 
result of U.S. v. Palmer in the halls of the Congress was the 
passage of [the Act of 1819]. . . .”). 
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invoked the definition of piracy under “the law of 
nations.” Id. The ATS contains a similar invocation. It 
too confers jurisdiction over “all causes where an 
alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of 
nations. . . .” Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20 § 9, 1 Stat. 
77. It would be passing strange for this Court to find 
that precisely the type of language Congress used to 
confer universal jurisdiction – and to overrule the 
Court’s limiting presumption once before – does not 
now confer universal jurisdiction to apply the law of 
nations. 
 Indeed, when courts use the law of nations as the 
rule of decision none of the presumption’s motivating 
rationales apply. To the contrary, the rationales may 
even argue in favor of the exercise of U.S. jurisdiction 
to fulfill U.S. obligations under international law in 
some cases – for example, in cases where the United 
States has a responsibility to punish universal of-
fenses like piracy. The presumption aims “to protect 
against unintended clashes between our laws and 
those of other nations which could result in interna-
tional discord,” EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Ar-
amco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991), and to heed the 
presumption that when Congress legislates, it “is 
primarily concerned with domestic conditions.” Id. 
Although the ATS is a primarily jurisdictional stat-
ute, Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712, the presumption could in 
principle apply if courts were to use purely domestic 
U.S. common law principles as rules of decision. In 
that situation, it would be courts, not Congress, 
crafting “our laws.” Yet those laws could still 
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“clash[ ] ” with foreign laws inside foreign territory. 
Aramco, 449 U.S. at 248. 
 But when U.S. courts apply the law of nations, 
the potential for true conflicts of laws largely disap-
pears. Unlike, for example, the Securities Exchange 
Act at issue in Morrison, or the Sherman Antitrust 
Act at issue in F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. 
Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004) – both of which 
involved projecting purely U.S. domestic laws into 
foreign territory – the same law of nations applies at 
home and abroad. Concerns about extraterritorial 
applications of U.S. law conflicting with foreign law 
inside foreign territory thus largely vanish since U.S. 
law authorizes application of an international law 
already operative inside the foreign territory.10 And 
 
 10 The argument that the ATS should not reach foreign 
harms because it is unique in authorizing civil liability under 
international law fails for at least three reasons. As an initial 
matter, civil liability is explicitly built into the statute. Pre-
sumptions are only that: presumptions. They do not apply where 
statutes are clear, and the ATS is clear on civil liability. Second, 
as noted above, using international criminal law to discern the 
norm of international law actionable under the ATS is consistent 
with Sosa’s methodology, see supra Part I. Indeed, requiring a 
freestanding norm of civil liability in international law would 
effectively render the ATS a dead letter, contrary to Sosa’s 
methodology and clear finding that the ATS is not a mere 
“jurisdictional convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by a 
future Congress . . . to make some element of the law of nations 
actionable for the benefit of foreigners.” 542 U.S. 692, 719 
(2004). Finally, as Part III explains below, international law 
allows jurisdiction in civil suits between foreigners arising out of 
foreign conduct or transactions.  
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while the presumption that Congress legislates with 
only domestic concerns in mind may make sense for 
statutes reflecting national values and preferences 
like the securities or antitrust laws, that presumption 
holds far less intuitive force when Congress autho-
rizes application of the law of nations, which, after 
all, deals by definition with foreign nations and 
shared values and preferences with those nations. 
Morrison explained that courts could consider “con-
text” in determining the geographic scope of statutes. 
130 S. Ct. at 2883. Here the context is that the stat-
ute authorizes application of international, not do-
mestic, law. In that connection, the relevant canon of 
construction should be Charming Betsy, under which 
courts construe ambiguous statutes in conformity 
with international law, see Murray v. The Schooner 
Charming Betsy (The Charming Betsy), 6 U.S. (2 
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804), and which would allow and 
sometimes even encourage U.S. jurisdiction, even 
where there is no U.S. connection to the violation of 
the law of nations.  
 In sum, when Congress authorizes application of 
the law of nations, it should be presumed to authorize 
application of all of the law of nations, including the 
relevant law of jurisdiction. As the next two Parts 
explain, the law of nations permits universal jurisdic-
tion in civil suits. In fact, historical authorities from 
the Middle Ages through the 19th Century suggest 
that it would have been contrary to the law of nations 
at the time of the ATS’s enactment to close U.S. 
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courts to foreigners, thereby discriminating against 
them and denying them access to justice. 
 
II. The Law of Nations Imposes a Duty to 
Provide Foreigners Access to Justice for 
Claims Arising Anywhere 
 In the 20th and 21st Centuries there has been a 
superfluity of sensitivity regarding territorial sover-
eignty. But from the Middle Ages through the 19th 
Century, the consideration that dwarfed all others 
was the avoidance of war. Armed hostilities were 
unrestrained by rules; civilian noncombatants were 
not spared if they were near the war zones; the 
fighting was savage and cruel. Brigands roamed the 
countryside.11 The basic rules of international law 
were respected because their observance tended to 
reduce friction that might lead to unwanted war. 
Territorial sovereignty (the term “sovereignty” was 
not used much) could be compromised by incursions 
like capitulatory regimes, which today we would find 
almost inconceivable.12 Yet there was no rule of cus-
tomary international law prohibiting recourse to war; 
such a rule did not arise until 1928.13 The only rule 
 
 11 See Barbara Tuchman, A DISTANT MIRROR (1978). 
 12 One of the last capitulatory regimes, that of the United 
States in Morocco, came to an end in the 1950s.  
 13 Treaty Between the United States and Other Powers 
Providing for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument of 
National Policy, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57. 
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about war was that unjust wars were prohibited.14 
But this rule had no practical effect since every party 
to a war claimed that justice was on their side. Yet 
the concept of justice had a very strong role to play in 
avoiding war and establishing national courts. 
 
A. The Law of Nations Historically Re-
quired Access to Justice15 
 For clarity, the discussion that follows uses 
generic identifiers: 
 A, B, C, D = independent states 
 B = state within which the tort takes place 
 J = national of A and plaintiff  
 K = national of B  
 In the Middle Ages when trade between Euro-
pean nations and the Far East became a huge source 
of new wealth, and caravans of 10,000 camels were 
not uncommon, armed gangs of thieves and brigands 
would strike quickly against part of the caravan, 
 
 14 JAMES BROWN SCOTT, THE SPANISH ORIGIN OF INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: FRANCISCO DE VITORIA AND HIS LAW OF NATIONS 
(2000).  
 15 Among the many books and articles consulted for this 
historical review, the following are the most salient: ALWYN V. 
FREEMAN, THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR 
DENIAL OF JUSTICE (1938); JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005); GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1960); EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE 
LAW OF NATIONS (Joseph Chitty ed., Philadelphia, T. & J. W. 
Johnson 1853) (1758). 
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gather loot, and run away. Suppose an attack took 
place in B as J’s caravan passed through to its home 
in A. The traders who with J suffered property losses 
and in many cases personal injuries, appealed to the 
king of A to order an armed expedition against B to 
recover the worth of the stolen property. The king, 
terrified of starting a war, refused. J and his fellow 
merchants resorted to self-help. They hired mercenar-
ies and formed a mini-army that entered B’s territory 
and killed the people of the nearest cities and towns. 
They collected money and valuables until J decided 
that the loot was sufficient to repay his losses and 
also pay the salaries of the mercenaries. They re-
turned to A, having completed their reprisal against 
B. 
 Although theoretically sound, reprisals in prac-
tice were subject to many abuses: for example, the 
mercenaries got greedy and turned to all-out aggres-
sion against B; or the mercenaries’ motives were 
misinterpreted leading to B’s initiation of a full-
fledged war. The practical problems were solved by 
one of the most ingenious devices in the history of 
international relations: the unilateral issuance of 
letters of marque and reprisal. Let us go back to the 
king’s refusal to use his armies to invade B. Instead 
of remitting J to self-help, the king issues to J a letter 
of marque if the reprisal is going to involve vessels in 
and around the Mediterranean Sea, or a letter of 
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reprisal if the hostilities will be land-based.16 A typical 
Letter of Reprisal authorized the trader (J, in our 
example) to mount an expedition to invade the host 
country (B, in our example) and to engage in forcible 
reprisals as described and sworn to by J. The Letter 
would recite that the trader had tried to petition the 
king of B for restitution, that his property had been 
unjustly taken from him by nationals of B within B, 
that J was justified by the king of A in mounting a 
limited-purpose expeditionary force. The Letter also 
provided that the target of the expedition was strictly 
confined to named towns and villages; the maximum 
monetary value of the property the trader could take 
(to cover his losses plus the costs of the expedition) 
was specified; an assurance was given that once the 
trader achieved his goal, the expeditionary force 
would not engage in self-serving acts of violence but 
rather would depart; and a time limit was specified 
during which the Letter of Reprisal remained valid. If 
any of these conditions were violated by J, then the 
king of B had the right to send in his armies to fight J 
and his mercenaries. Additional clauses, express or 
implied in various letters, stated the general under-
standing that if host country citizens were killed 
defending their property, it was an inevitable by-
product of the reprisal and not its purpose. In sum, 
the Letter of Reprisal served to require that the 
 
 16 The United States Constitution provides that Congress 
shall have Power to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal.” 
U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, cl. 11.  
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reprisal be proportional to the injury the trader 
suffered, thus reducing the risk of runaway tit-for-tat 
sanctioning.  
 The conditions specified in a letter of reprisal 
could have been violated by J and his mercenaries 
when they were in the territory of B, but then, when 
they wanted to go home to A, the king of A could be 
waiting to arrest them for transgressing the terms of 
the reprisal. Thus the terms of the reprisal were 
efficiently enforced even without the participation of 
the king of B. Although the act of reprisal might have 
looked like a war, it was the opposite: it helped main-
tain the peace. Evidence of this remarkable success of 
the reprisal mechanism is found in the references to 
reprisals in treaties of peace. Those treaties would be 
the last place to find approval of reprisals if the 
reprisals were viewed as prolongations of war. For 
example, the Treaty of Ryswick provided: 
The ordinary course of Justice shall be free 
and open on both sides, and the Subjects 
both of the one and the other Dominion may 
pursue their Rights, Suits and Pretensions, 
according to the Laws and Statutes of each 
Country; and then without any Distinction 
obtain all the Satisfaction that is justly due 
to them;17 
 
 17 Treaty of Ryswick, Between France and the United 
Provinces, Sept. 20, 1697, Art. 12. 
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 And the Treaty of Utrecht contained this provi-
sion: 
That the ordinary Distribution of Justice be 
restored and open again thro’ the Kingdoms 
and Dominions of each of their Royal 
Majestys; so that it may be free for all the 
Subjects on both sides to prosecute and ob-
tain their Rights, Pretensions and Actions; 
according to the Laws, Constitutions, and 
Statutes of each Kingdom: and especially, if 
there be Complaints concerning any Injurys 
or Grievances which have been done contrary 
to the Tenor of the Treatys, either in time of 
Peace, or at the beginning of the War lately 
ended, care shall be taken that the Damages 
be forthwith made good, according to the 
Rules of Justice.18 
 The biggest flaw, or hole, in the system of repris-
als was not in how they were carried out, but in how 
they were procured. A trader might misrepresent to 
his home-state king that his caravan was attacked 
and suffered significant losses in property. The king 
might have no way of checking whether the trader 
was telling the truth. This impasse was solved by the 
rise of two of the most significant and enduring rules 




 18 Treaty of Utrecht, Between Great Britain, France, 
Ireland, and Spain, July 13, 1713, Art. VII. 
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must be open to foreigners on a fair and nondiscrimi-
natory basis, and (2) the rule known as denial of 
justice. 
 
1. Primary Function of Courts 
 The most fundamental reason for a state to 
establish courts is to prevent parties to controversies 
from resorting to self-help or taking private revenge.19 
Over the long term this worked so long as the courts 
were perceived as unbiased, uncorrupted, and acting 
according to fair rules of procedure. Since there would 
always be a number of plaintiffs who were aliens, and 
because prior to the 20th Century there were no in-
ternational courts, a rule of customary international 
law developed early to the effect that a nation’s courts 
must be open to aliens on a procedurally fair and 
uncorrupted basis.20 
 In cases where both parties were nationals, there 
was little that a losing party could do about an unfair 
judgment. But if the losing party was a foreigner, 
then that person might go back to his home state and 
persuade the king to take military action against the 
 
 19 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, 
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 
86 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
 20 The U.S. Constitution embodies this rule of customary 
international law in Article III, Section 2, which provides that 
judicial power shall extend to all cases “between a State, or the 
Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects.” U.S. 
Const. art. III, sec. 2.  
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host state.21 Customary international law quickly 
developed a supplement to the rule requiring national 
courts to be open fairly to aliens. This additional rule 
established the important requirement that whatever 
the procedures of national courts might be, there 
should be no procedural discrimination against 
aliens.22 Aliens should not be treated below the “na-
tional standard.” If nevertheless there was discrimi-
nation against aliens, then the rapidly developing 
rule of “denial of justice” entered the picture. 
 
2. The Rule of Denial of Justice 
 Emmerich de Vattel – whom the Framers of the 
Constitution relied upon as the authoritative text on 
the law of nations – defined “denial of justice” as 
follows: 
 (1) A refusal to hear the complaints of 
a [foreign] State or of its subjects or to allow 
the subjects to assert their rights before the 
ordinary tribunals. 
 
 21 This sounds strange today, but in the climate of opinion 
in the Middle Ages, states were small and had limited military 
power, and foreign plaintiffs might be traders whose business 
was vitally important to the economy of host states and home 
states.  
 22 The rule did not work in reverse. Nationals that were 
party to lawsuits in their own state could not demand higher 
procedural standards that were accorded to aliens. Compare the 
(misguided) perception voiced by some commentators today that 
the ATS treats aliens better than citizens.  
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 (2) By pretended delays, for which no 
good reason can be given; delays equivalent 
to a refusal or even more injurious than one.  
 (3) By a decision manifestly unjust and 
one-sided. But the injustice must be evident 
and unmistakable.23 
 It was with the rapid growth of the practice of 
denial of justice that kings found a solution to the 
initial corroboration necessary before taking a trad-
er’s word for it that he had been robbed in another 
state and wanted a Letter of Reprisal. In the space of 
less than a hundred years, kings had made a denial of 
justice into a condition precedent to the issuance of 
letters of marque and reprisal. The flaw in the system 
was repaired. Henceforth, an application by an ag-
grieved national for a Letter of Reprisal had to be 
supported by papers showing a denial of justice. Thus 
if trader J is injured and robbed while taking his 
caravan through B, he would first have to sue the 
government of B before J could mount a reprisal 
 
 23 VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, Bk. II, Ch. XVIII, § 350. As 
stated by the Harvard Research Draft of 1929: “A State is 
responsible if an injury to an alien results from a denial of 
justice. Denial of justice exists when there is a denial, unwar-
ranted delay or obstruction of access to courts, gross deficiency 
in the administration of judicial or remedial process, failure to 
provide those guarantees which are generally considered 
indispensable to the proper administration of justice, or a 
manifestly unjust judgment. An error of a national court which 
does not produce manifest injustice is not a denial of justice. 
Article 9, Harvard Research Draft, 23 AM. J. INT’L L. 173 (Spec. 
Suppl. 1929). 
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mission against B. If the lawsuit is successful, J’s 
claim would be deemed satisfied. If unsuccessful, J 
would have to prove that the lawsuit violated one of 
the three Vattelian criteria for denial of justice. 
 Using the judicial decision as a condition prece-
dent gave new powers of authority to the judiciary. 
First, there was no need for a court to enforce a 
judgment when the judgment itself had the power 
either of triggering or of suppressing a potential 
reprisal. Second, the judicial procedures became open 
to sharp scrutiny; it was no longer easy for judges to 
vote their biases against foreign parties. (Even so, the 
judges themselves might be biased. A strong impetus 
for the ATS was the realization that Europeans did 
not want to prosecute U.S. tortfeasors in U.S. state 
courts; the ATS provided a federal (and ostensibly 
fairer) forum for alien plaintiffs in the United States.) 
Third and most important is the fact that two torts, 
not just one, are involved in cases of potential denial 
of justice. Let us call the first tort the “underlying 
tort,” and the second one the “derivative tort.” Sup-
pose J, a trader carrying merchandise, is assaulted 
and robbed by K. Although the parties are from dif-
ferent states, international law never took cognizance 
of ordinary torts such as these. J would typically sue 
K in an ordinary court in whatever country J found 
K. But if J did not receive justice in the court he chose 
(injustice has to go farther than merely losing the 
case), then a second, derivative tort arises. It is the 
tort perpetrated by the judicial system of the country 
where J is suing. The evidence of this judicial tort is 
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defined by the customary law of nations. Since the 
criteria of the derivative tort are the same every-
where, J could file suit in any state’s court where he 
could find and serve K. 
 J’s choice of venue is salient in respect of the 
question addressed by this Amicus Brief. Suppose, 
first, that J brings suit in his home state A. J’s evi-
dentiary showing would be tainted, perhaps unfairly, 
by the fact that J is choosing the home court ad-
vantage. Suppose, second, that J sues K and B in B. 
Since the derivative tort occurred in B (our original 
definition), J would suspect B of being unable to 
deliver an unbiased result through its court system. 
Suppose, third, that J sues B in C for the derivative 
tort. The courts of C would have to take the case (rule 
of customary international law). J may prefer the 
courts of C because of C’s neutral position, and also if 
B has assets in C that J could attach.24 (C represents 
the United States in the present Question Presented.) 
 The importance to the international legal system 
of having judicial resolutions of all cases and contro-
versies (lest they escalate into wars) is thus proved by 
the considerations involved in the triangular set of 
case ?denial of justice ?letter of reprisal. J, the ag-
grieved party, had his choice of national courts. All 
the courts would be applying the same law, namely, 
the international law of derivative torts.  
 
 24 B’s public assets in C, such as B’s embassy building, were, 
according to Vattel, not attachable.  
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III. The Law of Nations Contemplates Univer-
sal Jurisdiction in Civil Suits 
 The duty to provide access to justice endured 
through the 19th Century and supports universal 
jurisdiction in civil suits between foreigners under 
the ATS. As this Court acknowledged in Sosa,25 the 
law of nations traditionally included both public and 
private international law26 and linked torts and 
crimes. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 723 (rejecting Sosa’s 
argument that law-of-nations violations were only 
“public wrongs” and explaining that “Vattel explicitly 
linked” criminal and civil remedies); see also David J. 
Seipp, The Distinction Between Crime and Tort in the 
Early Common Law, 76 B.U. LAW REV. 59, 59 (1996) 
 
 25 542 U.S. at 715 (“The law of nations included a second, 
more pedestrian element, however, that did fall within the 
judicial sphere, as a body of judge-made law regulating the 
conduct of individuals situated outside domestic boundaries and 
consequently carrying an international savor.”).  
 26 See, e.g., Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. 519, 589 
(1839) (describing private international law and conflict of laws 
in particular as part of “the law of nations”); JOSEPH STORY, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4 (Little, Brown and 
Co., 5th ed. 1857) (describing “the importance of . . . internation-
al principles in matters of mere private right and duty”); id. at 
§ 9 (“The jurisprudence, then, arising from the conflict of the 
laws of different nations, in their actual application to modern 
commerce and intercourse, is a most interesting and important 
branch of public law. To no part of the world is it of more interest 
and importance than to the United States. . . . This branch of 
public law may, therefore, be fitly denominated private interna-
tional law. . . .”); id. at § 30 (including private international law 
as part “of the acknowledged law of nations”).  
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(“The distinction between crime and tort was not a 
difference between two kinds of wrongful acts. In 
most instances, the same wrong could be prosecuted 
either as a crime or as a tort. Nor was the distinction 
a difference between the kinds of persons who could 
initiate the actions. Victims could initiate both 
kinds.”) (emphasis added).  
 Then, as now, transitory torts can be brought in 
U.S. courts. In fact, as the previous Part above and 
the writings of Joseph Story quoted below explain, it 
would have been contrary to the law of nations at the 
time of the ATS’s enactment to close U.S. courts to 
foreigners, thereby discriminating against them and 
denying them access to justice. As to the ATS in 
particular, under longstanding principles of public 
and private international law, the law of nations 
provides conduct-regulating rules defining actionable 
universal jurisdiction violations of international law 
and forum law, or the lex fori, provides the remedy.  
 
A. The Law of Nations Authorizes Uni-
versal Adjudicative Jurisdiction 
 To begin, as a matter of adjudicative jurisdiction 
there is nothing exceptional about U.S. courts enter-
taining suits between foreigners arising out of foreign 
conduct or transactions, and it certainly is not a 
violation of international law. Joseph Story could not 
have been clearer on this point – the relevant section 
from his famous Commentaries on the Conflict of 
Laws is reproduced in full immediately below: 
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There are nations, indeed, which wholly re-
fuse to take cognizance of controversies be-
tween foreigners, and remit them for relief to 
their own domestic tribunals, or to that of 
the party defendant; and especially, as to 
matters originating in foreign countries. 
Thus, in France, with few exceptions, the 
tribunals do not entertain jurisdiction of con-
troversies between foreigners respecting per-
sonal rights and interests. But this is a 
matter of mere municipal policy and conven-
ience, and does not result from any principles 
of international law. In England and Amer-
ica, on the other hand, suits are maintain-
able, and are constantly maintained, between 
foreigners, where either of them is within the 
territory of the State in which the suit is 
brought.  
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF 
LAWS § 542 (Little, Brown and Co., 5th ed. 1857) 
(emphasis added). This has been so throughout U.S. 
history. See Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 885 (collecting 
cases). In other words, all that is needed is personal 
jurisdiction. See id; see also STORY, COMMENTARIES at 
§ 554 (“It has already been stated, that by the com-
mon law personal actions, being transitory, may be 
brought in any place where the party defendant can 
be found.”). In fact, according to Story: 
All that any nation can, therefore, be justly 
required to do, is to open its own tribunals to 
foreigners, in the same manner and to the 
same extent, as they are open to its own sub-
jects; and to give them the same redress, as to 
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rights and wrongs, which it deems fit to 
acknowledge in its own municipal code for 
natives and residents. 
Id. at § 557 (emphasis added). According to Story, 
private international law was a matter of “interna-
tional justice.” Id. at § 3; see also id. at § 557 (“The 
business of the administration of justice by any 
nation is, in a peculiar and emphatic sense, a part of 
its public right and duty.”). Thus there is nothing 
unique about U.S. courts entertaining suits between 
foreigners, even “as to matters originating in foreign 
countries”: such suits “are maintainable, and are 
constantly maintained” in the United States, and 
affording redress to foreigners was a matter of inter-
national justice. Id. at §§ 542, 547.  
 
B. The Law of Nations Authorizes Uni-
versal Prescriptive Jurisdiction to 
Apply International Law and Reme-
dies Under the Lex Fori  
 The question then becomes what prescriptive 
jurisdiction or law applies to foreign violations of the 
law of nations. As Part I of this Brief explained, when 
courts exercise universal jurisdiction they do not 
apply national law but the law of nations. That is, 
international law itself prescribes the applicable 
conduct-regulating rule. And in civil suits between 
foreigners for claims arising abroad private interna-
tional law has long provided that the law of the 
forum, or the lex fori, supplies the remedy. Again, 
Story could not have been clearer: 
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It is universally admitted and established, 
that the forms of remedies, and the modes of 
proceeding, and the execution of judgments, 
are to be regulated solely and exclusively by 
the laws of the place where the action is in-
stituted; or, as the civilians uniformly ex-
press it, according to the Lex fori. 
Id. at § 556; see also, e.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Air-
lines, Inc., 9 N.Y. 34, 41 (1961) (“As to conflict of law 
rules it is of course settled that the law of the forum 
is usually in control as to procedures including reme-
dies.”) (Desmond, J.). To be sure, “the forms of reme-
dies and the order of judicial proceedings are to be 
according to the law of the place where the action is 
instituted, without any regard to the domicile of the 
parties, the origin of the right, or the country of the 
act.” STORY, COMMENTARIES at § 558 (emphasis added). 
As noted, to treat foreigners differently could have 
amounted to a denial of justice, or, according to Story, 
a refusal of what a nation was “justly required to do.” 
Id. at § 557.  
 Thus where liability existed on a foreign contract, 
Story explained, whether such liability could be 
enforced against the defendant through personal 
arrest, or only in rem, depended on the law of the 
forum, not foreign law. This “better opinion now 
established both in England and America” was actu-
ally exemplified by, among other cases, what today 
some would call a “foreign-cubed” case: namely, “a 
recent case in England, where the plaintiff and the 
defendant were both foreigners, and the debt was 
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contracted in a country, by whose laws the defendant 
would not have been liable to an arrest.” STORY, 
COMMENTARIES at § 571. In the case, De la Vega v. 
Vianna, the plaintiff, a Spaniard, arrested the de-
fendant, a Portuguese, in England for a debt arising 
out of a contract entered into in Portugal. (1830), 109 
Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B.); 1 B. & Ad. 284. The defendant 
challenged his arrest on the basis that Portuguese 
law governing the contract, or the lex causae, did not 
establish that form of remedy. Id. The House of Lords 
flatly rejected this argument. Id. at 793. Lord 
Tenterton explained that the foreign party in England 
“must take the law as he finds it. . . . He is to have 
the same rights which all the subjects of this kingdom 
are entitled to.” Id. See also STORY, COMMENTARIES at 
§ 571. The same should hold for ATS suits under 
these longstanding international legal principles. The 
law of nations creates liability for universal jurisdic-
tion violations, and the ATS supplies the form of 
remedy. A foreign defendant in U.S. court “must take 
the law as he finds it,” and foreign plaintiffs are “to 
have the same rights which all the [citizens of the 
United States] are entitled to.” De la Vega v. Vianna, 
(1830), 109 Eng. Rep. 792-93 (K.B.); 1 B. & Ad. 284; 
STORY, COMMENTARIES at § 571. 
--------------------------------- ? --------------------------------- 
 
CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, the ATS expressly invokes the law 
of nations, and that law authorizes and sometimes 
requires jurisdiction over causes of action arising 
35 
anywhere in the world. It would compromise the 
statute’s text as well as ignore longstanding canons of 
construction to limit the ATS to claims arising in the 
United States. 
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